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The Summit Water Distribution Company, Leon H. Saunders, Stuart Knowles, 
Trilogy Limited, L.P. and Lynn Nelson (collectively "Summit Water"), Appellants, 
pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(c), submits this Reply brief to Appellee's Brief 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue before the Court is whether Summit County is entitled to claim that its 
authority to regulate water rights, water appropriation, water source capacity or facilities 
for culinary water rests upon the County Land Use Development Management Act 
("CLUDMA"). Defendants concede that CLUDMA does not expressly grant to the 
counties authority for such water regulation. Neither do Defendants dispute the existence 
of a comprehensive statutory scheme which places responsibility for regulation of all 
aspects of water, water companies and water facilities with the State of Utah. 
Rather than explain to this Court why it should conclude that Summit County's 
comprehensive regulation of water is a land use zoning decision authorized by 
CLUDMA, contrary to express provisions of CLUDMA and contrary to the Supreme 
Court's decision Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, Defendants instead argue that 
the only relevant inquiry is whether Summit County, in adopting Concurrency Ordinance 
No. 436, declared that "they consider [the Ordinance] necessary for the use and 
development of land within the County." Appellee's Br. at p. 17. According to 
Defendants, that statement is magical and this Court is obligated to defer to the County's 
invented conclusion that, first, its regulation is authorized as a land use zoning decision 
under CLUDMA and, second, that it has properly promulgated the ordinance pursuant to 
that authority. Under Defendants' analysis, the County has the power to determine its 
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own authority under CLUDMA and to then determine that is has acted within the scope 
of that self-declared authority. Moreover, the Court, according to Defendants, must defer 
to those determinations, presuming their validity. 
Unless this Court adopts Defendants' ipse dixit argument, and thereby give the 
County virtually unlimited, self-defined, authority under CLUDMA, Defendants' 
argument must fail. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court dismissed Summit Water's claims against Defendants as untimely 
under the 30-day limitation of section 17-27-1001 of CLUDMA. Those claims asserted 
Defendants' fraudulent failure to comply with, or to enforce, the Summit County 
Concurrency Ordinance and requested injunctive relief requiring compliance with the its 
provisions. The issue for this Court's determination is whether the State of Utah 
authorized Summit County to adopt an ordinance for the regulation of water through 
CLUDMA. 
Defendants first argue that CLUDMA, and specifically section 17-27-401 
providing authority to "enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and 
development," authorizes the comprehensive water regulation found in Ordinance No. 
436, because of the broad authority granted under that provision. Defendants' sole 
authority for this proposition is the note of second year law student Adam Strachan 
entitled NOTE: Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land Use Regulation, 21 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 435 (2001) written with the assistance of Summit County 
Commissioner, and concurrency architect, Eric Schifferli. The provisions of CLUDMA 
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are devoid of any such express grant of authority, as Defendants tacitly concede, forcing 
them to adopt the untenable position that the County has virtually unlimited authority 
under CLUDMA. Moreover, the fact that the State of Utah, through the State Engineer, 
Water Board and Division of Drinking Water, has established comprehensive legislation 
and rules for the regulation of water demonstrates that such regulation is not an aim of 
CLUDMA. CLUDMA did not authorize Summit County to adopt Ordinance No. 436 
and the lower court erred in dismissing Summit Water's claim based on the provisions of 
that act. 
Defendants also argue that because Summit County purportedly determined that 
Ordinance No. 436 was necessary for land use planning, this Court must simply defer to 
that assessment by the County. Defendants' argument, that the County can determine its 
own authority and then legislate pursuant to that determination without meaningful 
judicial review, would vest in the County virtually unlimited authority. CLUDMA both 
empowers the County and limits its authority. Because the State of Utah has not 
authorized Summit County to regulate water rights, water appropriations, water 
companies and water facilities under CLUDMA, Summit County's arguments must fail 
and the trial court ruling must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUMMIT COUNTY WATER CONCURRENCY ORDINANCE, 
WHICH REGULATES WATER RIGHTS, WATER APPROPRIATION, 
WATER SOURCE CAPACITY AND FACILITIES FOR THE PROVISION 
OF CULINARY WATER, IS NOT A LAND USE ZONING ORDINANCE. 
Summit County Ordinance No. 436 empowers the Summit County Director of 
Health to review the "water rights, water source capacity, reserve source capacity, storage 
capacity, system capacity, recurrent number of service connections, outstanding 
commitments/boards/service letters and other system demands, any surplus capacity and 
number of ERC's that it can serve with its surplus capacity . . ." and to preclude use of 
water rights, water source capacities and water source facilities in Summit County 
based on that review. (Ordinance No. 436; R. 042-48.) The Ordinance does far more 
than allow the County to "evaluate" water companies and their resources as argued by 
Defendants. It allows the County to preclude a water company from using water rights, 
appropriations, sources, source capacity and facilities despite the fact that all have been 
reviewed and approved by the State of Utah under its comprehensive regulation in those 
areas. 
Notwithstanding the obvious nature of that Ordinance as a water regulation, 
Defendants argue that Ordinance No. 436 must be found to be a land use zoning 
regulation, promulgated pursuant to CLUDMA, because in adopting that Ordinance, 
Summit County declared that it was. The County having so declared, Defendants 
continue in their argument, it is beyond the power of this Court to look further to 
determine whether CLUDMA does, in fact, empower Summit County to regulate water. 
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Thus, Defendants arrive at the allegedly inescapable conclusion that under CLUDMA, 
the State has granted to Summit County authority to do virtually whatever it desires 
provided only that it declare that the object of its desire is "considered] necessary for the 
use and development of land within the County . . . ." Appellee's Brief at p. 17. 
Contrary to that argument, CLUDMA is not a blanket carte blanche grant of authority 
from the State to Summit County and neither is Ordinance No. 436 a land use regulation. 
A. CLUDMA Does Not Authorize Summit County to Regulate Water 
Under the Guise of a Land Use Zoning Decision. 
Counties are devoid of authority to legislate except to the extent that authority is 
expressly granted to them by the State of Utah. E.g., Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 
2001 UT App. 55, 21 P.3d 245. Through CLUDMA the State of Utah granted counties 
authority "to regulate land use" through the enactment of ordinances and granting of 
permits relating to zoning and subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-102; Toone v. 
Weber County, 2002 UT 103 lj 7, 57 P.3d 1079. In Toone v. Weber County the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically identified those areas over which CLUDMA granted 
counties' authority, none of which encompass water regulation, and thereafter stated: 
It is these substantive decisions, made in compliance with 
proper procedures that the term "land use decisions" in § 17-
27-1001 unambiguously refers. 
Id. at Tf 8. Thus the term "land use decision" is defined by the authority actually granted 
to the counties under CLUDMA and is not subject to definition by the county acting 
outside of such authority. Although Defendants cite to the language of Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-102 with regard to the general purposes of CLUDMA, they fail to comment on the 
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noticeable absence from those provisions of any purpose in CLUDMA to empower the 
counties to regulate water rights, water appropriation or use, water source capacity or 
water facilities. Indeed, Defendants have cited to no provision of CLUDMA empowering 
the counties to undertake such water regulation. 
Instead of addressing that absence of regulatory authorization, and undoubtedly 
because of that absence, Defendants argue that "CLUDMA's grant of authority is 
actually extremely broad," encompassing the regulation of water. Appellees' Br. at 16. 
As authority for the foregoing proposition, Defendants rely exclusively upon a law 
review note written by second year law student Adam Strachan entitled NOTE: 
Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land Use Regulation, 21 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 
435 (2001).1 The student Strachan states: 
The authority to enact Ordinance No. 400 comes from two 
provisions of the Utah Code. The first, Section 17-27-401 
delegates general zoning powers to the County for 
establishing "regulations for land use and development." 
Second, Section 17-50-302, delegates general police powers 
to the County which must be exercised to "perform functions 
that are reasonably related to the safety, health, morals and 
welfare" of the County's inhabitants. 
Id. at 451. Aside from the statutes themselves, Mr. Strachan cites no authority for the 
foregoing proposition that an ordinance providing for comprehensive regulation of water 
1
 Conspicuously absent from Defendants' citation to Mr. Strachan's article is the fact that 
it is a second year law student note. Also absent is any mention of the fact that Mr. 
Strachan specifically thanks Summit County Commissioner Eric Schifferli, one of the 
architects of the Summit County Concurrency Ordinances, for his assistance in writing 
the note. 
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should be determined to be a land use zoning ordinance under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-
401. 
It is not surprising that Defendants' argument is reduced to leiinuv .*r •'•. 
note. Apparently created U N h\cr the County's authority to regulate water. ih<; n< s^ H 
cc:s :^ noi is in - absence of any persuasive aulhoniy supporting Defendants position. 
In point of law, there snr.p 
regulate water as a laud use zoning decision.2 
•. i .-viendants uk u> c herokee Water & Sanitation District v. El Paso 
Count \ 
authority under CLUDMA. In that case, however, the Court found a county regulation 
requiring a three hundred year supply of wnter *™ Mcw suhdh ision^ to be expressly 
ai itl 101 ized by Cc I :>i aide state s • •• \-HV.^ M> -
eouiiiies from approving subdivisions absent evidence from the developer establishing 
"that definite provision has been made for a water supply that is sufliuent in terms of 
i | i i i i h l i l > l i i ' f K l u l i i h l l h i l l l i l i | I l l s lii i | t i i i' lull* , i l i m p p r u p i i l l l l " l l | > p l ' i u l V u i U ' l m I l l s I | U 
of subdivisions proposed." Id. at 1341. In light of that express prohibition anu direction 
to 'he Counh • - the State, the Court found that the County acted appropriately and 
2In the lower court. Defendants attempted to rely upon VJUIUCH \. i own oi Kainapo, 285 
N.E.2d2c)l (Cl. App. N.Y. 197J) for that proposition. However, as Summit Water points 
• ' :-*• opening brief, Town of Ramapo did not involve an Ordinance under which the 
i own purported to regulate water. Rather, the Ordinance in question in that case simply 
ired the existence of certain basic facilities, presumably regulated under other laws, 
... r - <;^M ,.i.v-*.*-.cnf to be approved. 
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within the bounds of its authority in adopting the regulation in question. No such state 
legislation, however, exists in Utah.3 
As discussed in Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. N.Y. 
1972), concurrency ordinances, generally meaning those ordinances which require 
development of essential facilities concurrent with development, have had their genesis in 
the area of land use development. In no case cited by Defendants, and in no case found 
by Plaintiffs, however, has any such concurrency ordinance purported to regulate those 
essential facilities themselves, whether they are water, schools, roads, or other such 
facilities. 
B. Defendants9 Argument for Virtually Unlimited Authority Under 
CLUDMA is Without Basis. 
Defendants cannot, and therefore do not, dispute that in Utah, the State Engineer is 
charged with general supervisory responsibility over the waters of the State. Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-2-1. Neither can Defendants dispute that the Drinking Water Board, through 
Division of Drinking Water ("DDW"), has promulgated voluminous detailed regulations 
governing the quality and quantity of drinking water sources and the design and operation 
of drinking water facilities of its systems (Utah Admin. Code R. 309-100-705) or that 
DDW has promulgated comprehensive requirements for source development, facility 
design and operation, water quality, source sizing and transmission and distribution 
pipelines (Utah Admin. Code R. 309-204, 500, 505, 510 and 550). Neither is the 
3
 Like Ramapo, the regulation at issue in Cherokee Water simply required the developer 
to show a water source. It did not purport to regulate that water source. Ordinance No. 
436, on the other hand, purports to regulate virtually every aspect of water and the 
companies and facilities providing water in Summit County. 
8 
conservat ive methodology uti l ized in state regulatory requi rements to assure con t inu ing 
adeqi late watei si ipplie s qi lestioi led b> Defei idai its I Ital i - uii i lii 1 C : >de R 309 510 II 
Rather , Defendants s imply state that " the existence of state regula t ion is wllolly 
immater ia l to the Coun ty ' s authori ty under C I / T D M A " in lk'hi of tlit C o u n t y ' s finding 
u : - : > piit in place siimciciii i h n . r i ,IL <.-I water compan ies abil i ty 
to p rov ide actual wet water to development . (Appel lee ' s Brief at p 16 ) 
The comprehens ive regulatory scheme set forth in the D D W ' s regj ia iu ' i i s , 
however , belies Defendants ' a rguments . i;.^v... a.-^se regulations specilicaih employ 
quanti t ies of water, consistentl \ meet ing applicable drinking water requ i rements . " _ 'an 
Admin . » ocu •• ..^ (.Kainnlv u Ordinance N»» -J - Sunniiit r m j n t ^ 
tf Di in ikinj ' 5 
areas covered b) the Ordinance , but, mul ing D D W ' s regulation to be inadequate , s tates: 
" W H E R E A S , neither the Division of Dr inking Water nor the County have in the past had 
,
 J
' f » ^ l t i p * . * , >* 
ol a Water S u p p l i e r ^ waiei sys tem ~,;d appurtenances and no cont inuing per iodic 
moni to r ing has been performed to ensure Water Suppl ier ' s cont inued abili ty to meet 
serv ice dei i lai ids c f its s> ste i i I; " ' Oi clii lai ice N o 1-36 at p 2; R at 28 ' 1 1: le Coi int> ' s 
de terminat ion that the state is ilot doing an adequate j o b in carrying out those areas in 
which it has retained authority, however , provides no basis for passage of legislation 
i ii i< h : t CI I JDM i V. . 
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Defendants' argument continues that because, in their view, Summit County stated 
that the regulation of water under Ordinance No. 436 was necessary for land use and 
development, the Court must give deference to, and assume the validity of, that 
determination citing for that proposition Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 636 
(Utah 1961); and Mavlor v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); and 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976). 
Each of the foregoing cases dealt with decisions as to the zoning of real property under 
authority clearly granted by the State of Utah under CLUDMA or its municipal 
counterpart. In none of those cases was there an issue considered or determined by the 
Court as to whether CLUDMA, or its municipal counterpart, actually authorized the 
substantive action, i.e., the micro-management of state water rights and regulations, taken 
by the county or municipality as a land use decision. That, of course, is the only issue 
before this Court. 
The County's authority to regulate land use is both authorized and limited by the 
grant of such authority from the State of Utah under CLUDMA. See, Hatch v. Boulder 
Town Council 2001 UT App. 55, % 7, 21 P.3d 245, 247; Toone, 2002 UT 103 Tj 7, 57 
P.3d 1079. As the Supreme Court found in Toone, "land use decisions" are defined by 
the specific authority granted to the County under the express provisions of CLUDMA. 
Contrary to Defendants' argument that the Court must defer to Summit County's 
determination that its water regulation ordinance is, in fact, a land use ordinance, in 
reality the County must "strictly comply with the statute delegating them the authority to 
act." Hatch, 2001 UT App. 55 If 7, 21 P.3d at 247. 
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In de te rmin ing whe the r Summi t Coun ty Ord inance N o 4 " 6 was p r o m u l g a t e d 
pursuant to ai itl ioi it)/ gi ai ite d t :) Si u i 11 i lit Cc i n lty i n idei CI \ JDIV 1 A, 1 10 deference need be 
given by the Court to Sui nmit County's self-determination that it has acted appropriately 
under tl lat statute. Rather, it is within 1u- ek-ar jurisdiction of the Coi irt to determine 
whether tl le State of I Ital 1 1 las ai itl lorized tl le County s action as a ""kind u^ devi:M.<n. * 
I Jndei 1:1 le pi o\ isioi is :)f CI \ J DN 1 - \ , tl le Si ipi en le Coi ii t's decisioi i ii i I oone ai id ii i light 
of the comprehensive State regulation* -! all aspect nl water, water rights. -.\aier 
appropriation, water faulilic.* uia; wilier matters relating to water alrcau\ reguiuk^ i ihe 
fact, whether or not Summit County viewed its actions in regulating water as "land use 
decisions" has ..- iJevance to the determination .- as authority to net under the statute. 
j • *! i e Dc: fe i ide w- • • -n -i * 
example . A s s u m e tllat the biate Aeronaut ics Board establ ishes an airport m Summi t 
County on property approved for that use, Summit County decides that the State 
A eroi lai itics Di < ' isic i i of tl le I Jtal i Depai tn lei it i < . • • • • 
take-offs, and taxiing are not adequate and, relying again on LLUDMA Summit Count) 
claims that it is entitled to regulate in more detail ™^roaches, take-offs and taxiing 
beeai lse it ii it > ' o l « - es i i "lai id i lse decision "'" Si n i n, las i IC it i ioi c ai ithoi ity o i- < ;: i tl ic: 
regulation and use of water as a "land use decision" than it does the operation of an 
airport. 
Defer idai its ai e sit npb • \ v i oi ig it I c •< : i ltei idii lg tl lat of CI • I JDh I / \ bestov > s I ij: oi l 
Summi t County the p o w e r to define its own authority under sec t ion 17-27-4U1 auu to 
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then adopt any regulation it deems necessary pursuant to that authority. To so construe 
the act would give virtually unlimited regulatory authority to the County provided only 
that the County first declare the regulation to be a "land use decision." No such authority 
is granted under CLUDMA. 
CLUDMA provides no authority for the regulation of water as a zoning power 
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-401 or otherwise. The limitation provision of Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-1001 therefore has no application to the claims asserted by Summit Water 
herein and the lower court erred in dismissing those claims. 
II. WHETHER THE MANDAMUS RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT 
WAS APPROPRIATE WAS NEVER DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT, AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF 
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE LIMITATION 
PROVISION OF CLUDMA APPLIED. 
Defendants assert, as an alternative argument, that because Summit Water had a 
review process available under CLUDMA, other plain, speedy and adequate remedies 
existed and the mandamus relief sought by Summit Water was inappropriate. First, there 
was no acknowledgment by Summit Water that the water concurrency determinations by 
Summit County are pursuant to CLUDMA. Second, the trial court did not rule on 
Defendants' arguments with regard to whether or not mandamus relief was appropriate in 
light of remedies provided under CLUDMA. Third, the trial court would have had no 
occasion to make a ruling on that argument in light of the court ruling that CLUDMA did 
provide a basis for the enactment of Ordinance No. 436. 
Once the Court determined that CLUDMA provided authority for the County to 
adopt Ordinance No. 436, and that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 
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therefore applied, the Court necessarily determined that the Complaint had i ol 1 ecu 
til i idy filed i if idei 1:1 lat pi o v isioi i i \..s si icl i, i 10 issi ic t ei i ia.ii ic: d foi deterniii latioi i v\ ith 
regard to whether or noi M a n d a m u s relief was appropriate. 
Moreover , i f i ! -u u: • . W: determined that C L U D M A does not p rovide authori ty 
1 CM the adoption ••, «ordinance \\>. 436, tl le Coi u t coi lid i lot decide tl lat the r e \ iew process 
under seetioi I 1 ) 2 7 1001 p ro \ ides a plaii I speedy ai id adeqi late i ei i ledy pi e cli iding 
mandamus relief because that section would have no application to Summit W a t e r ' s 
claims, Since t;^ ,.;;.e; ^ <*nubie re i icl identified t ; ih .uuiani.s m their argument woiild 
because of the existence of such other re l ief 
CONCLUSION 
CLUDMA, the review provisions of lhai aei contained in Liali Code Ann. § 1,-27-1001 
have no applicatioi I '•••- ^ i claims asserted by Summit Water herein, The court, below 
limitation of CLUDMA under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001. 
This case should be reversed and remitted for further proceedings on Summit 
Water's fi ai id coi nplaint. 
13 
Respectfully submitted, 
SCOTT M. LILJA 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 S. Main Street, 16th Floor 
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